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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L. CRAIG KNUDSON, a/k/a
LEWIS CRAIG KNUDSON,

..
..

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES and
GOLDIE KNUDSON,

.•

Case No.

18162

Defendants and
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Third Judicial
District Court that affirmed an administrative action which had
ostensibly adjudicated Appellant's so-called "support debt" and
attendant obligation to

reim~urse

the Utah State Department of

Social Services for payments made by the Department to Appellant's
former wife (Co-Respondent) as support for the parties' child.
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Since the Appellant in the present proceeding was designated
as "Defendant" in the administrative proceedings and since the
Respondents herein were designated "Plaintiffs" in .that hearing, this
Brief will endeavor to avoid confusion by designating the parties
as follows:

Appellant shall be referred to as "Craig", "Craig

Knudson" or "Appellant."

Respondent, Utah State Department of

Social Services, shall be referred to as the "Department",
"Department of Social Services" or "Respondent."

Respondent,
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_,_

Goldie Knudson, shall be referred to as "Goldie'', "Goldie
Knudson" or "Co-Respondent."
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Craig and Goldie Knudson were married in Ogden, Utah on
June 24, 1972 (R.38, 69).

After their marriage, Craig worked

as a salesman for various companies, largely handling promotions,
liquidations and distress sales.

Goldie was occasionally employed

to work for these assorted companies on a temporary basis with
Craig (R.45).

Craig earned most of the family's regular income.

Goldie's employment was episodic in nature and the earnings
derived therefrom varied greatly (R.45).
The couple purchased a Fleetwood mobile home in November
or December of 1975 (R.44, 67, 70), paying approximately $2,000
as a down payment (R.44).

Title to the mobile home was taken

in Craig's name alone (R.53).

The balance of the purchase

price was financed by the W.E.A. Credit Union (R.67, 70).
After moving into the mobile home, Goldie ceased to work altogether
(R.45), and Craig made all of the installment payments thereon
(R.46 to 49).
A son was born to the Knudsons on July 8, 1977 (R.38).
Shortly thereafter, Craig obtained regular full-time employment
as a salesman at LaBelle's Catalog Showroom store in Ogden, Utah
(R.43).

In January of 1978 Craig was given a promotion by

LaBelle's and advanced to the position of sales manager for
the audio department at LaBelle's new store to be opened in
Provo, Utah (R.43).

The Knudsons prepared to move to Provo
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in order that Craig might assume his new job in March of 1978
(R.43, 44).

In this connection, Goldie advertised the mobile

home in Ogden for rent in the Ogden Standard Examiner (R.44, 52,
78).

The mobile home was rented for $225.00 per month (R.44,

52, 59), and Goldie accepted a security deposit from the prospective tenants (R.44, 59).

With the assistance of a U-Haul

trailer provided by LaBelle's, the Knudsons moved to Provo in
late February or early March of 1978 (R.44).
Craig obtained a suitable residence for his family in
Provo (R.44), and assumed his duties as audio manager at the
new store.

In order to prepare for the "grand opening," Craig

was required to work evenings, as well as days.

Goldie became

dissatisfied that Craig was not spending enough time with her
(R.44).

Consequently, one evening in March or early April of

1978, when Craig had returned from the store for a meal, Goldie
demanded that Craig spend more time with her and, in particular,
remain home that evening (R.44).

Craig told her that he was

required to return to work, whereupon she threatened to leave
(R.44).

In fact, Goldie left Craig that night and, with their

son, took up residence once again in the mobile home in Ogden
(R.44, 46).

The tenants had not then entered into occupancy

of the trailer; they were subsequently denied occupancy by
Goldie, who continues to reside in the trailer.
Shortly after she left Craig, Goldie began demanding that
Craig pay her $200 per month as child support (R.45, 46).
Craig and Goldie had a number of conversations concerning her
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demands for child support during April and May of 1978 (R.45,
46).

They reached an oral agreement that Craig would permit

Goldie to occupy the mobile home in Ogden rent-free in lieu of
cash support payments to her (R.46).

As part of this arrange-

ment, Craig was to continue to make the installment payments to
the credit union, to pay the lot rent for the trailer space
and otherwise to defer the expenses connected with the mobile
home (R.46).

At this time, Goldie had not filed for divorce

or otherwise sought support and maintenance from Craig in any
judicial proceeding.

Craig hoped to effect a reconciliation.

Sometime during the Summer of 1978, Goldie informed Craig
that she was seeking public assistance and that the welfare
department would seek reimbursement from him (R.45).

Subsequently,

Craig did receive a letter and two telephone calls from the
Department of Social Services with respect to such reimbursement
(R.46).

The first telephone call was received by Craig at the

LaBelle's store in Provo (R.46) sometime during October of 1978.
The caller was a gentleman who identified himself as an agent
of the Department of Social Services, and inquired whether or
not Craig was making support payments to his wife (R.46).
Craig explained the substance of his agreement with Goldie and
pointed out the fact that he was making the installment payment
on the trailer which she occupied, the lot payment on the trailer
space, the taxes on the trailer and the like (R.46).

Shortly

thereafter, Craig received another inquiry by telephone from
a Departmental agent.

This time the caller was a woman (R.46).

Craig explained to her the same things which he had previously
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described to the gentleman (R.47).

Upon the basis of these

conversations, Craig understood that these payments-in-kind
were satisfactory to the Department.

He was not aware of any

claim by either Goldie or the Department to the contrary until
this proceeding was commenced almost eighteen months later (R.46,
47' 59' 60).
A month or more after these telephone conversations, Goldie
filed a divorce action against Craig on or about December 5,
1978, in the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County
(Knudson v. Knudson, Civil No. 71529).

Notwithstanding the

provisions of Sections 78-45-7(3), 78-45-9, and 78-45b-3, the
Department of Social Services did not enter an appearance or
otherwise participate in the divorce action (R.66 to 74).
Early in the course of the divorce action, Goldie sought
temporary alimony and child support from Craig by a Motion for
Order to Show Cause, filed on or about February 26, 1979.

In

connection therewith, Goldie filed an Affidavit (R.76 to 77)
in which she recited the "amounts . . . reasonably necessary to
maintain (her) and her child."

As necessary expenditures for

support, Goldie's Affidavit begins by listing $173 per month
as the payment obligation on the mobile home, $8 per month as
insurance thereon, $60 per month as lot rent for the space
occupied by the trailer, and $15 per month as taxes assessed
against the trailer (R.75).

The cumulative amount of these

expenses is $256 per month.

At the time, Craig was, in fact,

paying all of these expenses (R.47 to 49, 79 to 83).
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Goldie

also sought an additional $445 per month in her Affidavit (R.76),
So far as the record discloses, no order of temporary
alimony or support was ever entered in the divorce action (R.39),
apparently because Craig was paying the expenses associated with
the housing of Goldie and the child.

The divorce proceeding

came on for an evidentiary hearing on August 23, 1979, but a
Decree was not entered and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were not made until November 21, 1979 (R.66 to 74).
The Decree (R.66 to 68) makes no mention of temporary
alimony or support whatsoever.

Goldie was awarded only $1 per

year as prospective alimony and maintenance (R.67, Para. 5).
Goldie was also awarded child support in the amount of $150 per
month (R.67, Para. 4).

However, Goldie was also ordered to

assume and pay the installment obligation on the mobile home
from and after September 1, 1979 (R.67, 68, Paras. 6 and 11).
The Court awarded each party one-half of the equity in the mobile
home as of Septebmer 1, 1979 (R.67).

Since the entry of the

Decree, Craig has complied with all provisions thereof.
The administrative proceeding to collect

support payments

was commenced on or about January 16, 1980, to recover for payments made by the Department to Goldie during the pendency of
the divorce action, but prior to the hearing thereon and prior
to the entry of the Decree therein.

The divorce action was

filed on or about December 5, 1978, and the hearing thereon
occurred on August 23, 1979.

Thus, the Department seeks re-

imbursement for support payments in the amount of $176 per month
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from December of 1978 through July of 1979.

During this period,

the Department provided benefits, for which it now seeks reimbursement from Craig, in the cumulative amount of $1,408.00.
During the same period, Craig provided benefits to Goldie at the
rate of $256 per month, for a cumulative total, over the same
period, of approximately

~2,048.00.

But since Craig provided

these benefits to Goldie in-kind, rather than in-cash, the
Department takes the position that Craig provided no support
to Goldie and, hence, should reimburse the State for its payments
on precisely the same basis as if Craig has provided no benefits
whatsoever to his family.
The administrative proceeding came on for hearing before
the Honorable Carolyn N. Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, on
February 26, 1980.
Craig Knudson.

The only witness to testify was Appellant,

Although Goldie was present at the hearing and

occasionally interjected unsolicited comments, she was not called
as a witness by the Department.

Indeed, the Department adduced

no evidence whatsoever, aside from its records concerning the
amount of money the Department had paid to Goldie over the period
in question (R.39, 62 to 65).

The Department did not interpose

any evidentiary objections to the testimony adduced by Appellant .
at the administrative hearing.

Consequently, the facts as

stated herein stand uncontroverted and undisputed.
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The foregoing uncontroverted testimony clearly demonstrates
the following essential propositions:
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1.

Goldie refused to reside·with her husband at his place

of employment and abandoned him to return to his mobile home
in Ogden.
2.

Thereafter, Goldie demanded that Craig pay her $200

per month as support for her and for their son.

After some dis-

cussions, Goldie agreed to accept rent-free occupation of the
trailer, together with certain associated benefits, in lieu of
such cash payments.
3.

The reasonable rental value of the trailer occupied

by Goldie and the child under this arrangement, as demonstrated
by the actual rental thereof prior to the parties' move to Provo,
exceeded $225 per month.
4.

The cost to Craig of providing such rent-free housing

for Goldie and the child amounted to approximately $256 per month.
5.

The Department of Social Services received actual notice

of the facts (i) that Craig was providing housing to Goldie and
the child on a gratis basis, (ii) that the provision of such
housing required a monthly expenditure somewhat in excess of the
support requested by Goldie for herself and for the child, (iii)
that Goldie had agreed to accept such rent-free housing in lieu
of cash payments of support, and (iv) that Craig was relying upon
a reasonable belief as to the efficacy of such an arrangement.
6.

The Department never entered an appearance in the

divorce action and never advised Craig that the continued provision of rent-free housing was unsatisfactory or less satisfactory
than payments in cash.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

7.

Goldie continued to accept rent-free housing from

Craig under the parties' previous arrangement even after the
commencement of the divorce action and after the receipt of welfare benefits from the Department.

Although Goldie moved for an

order granting her temporary alimony and child support, no such
order was ever entered in the divorce action, once it became
clear that Craig was already providing benefits to Goldie in an
amount equal to or in excess of the amount of any temporary
support to which she might conceivably be entitled under the
circumstances.
8.

Under the Decree of Divorce, Craig was relieved of

any obligation to continue the provision of rent-free housing
in the trailer for Goldie, an expense amounting to approximately
$256 per month, and ordered instead to make cash payments of
child support to her in the amount of $150 per month and alimony
in the amount of $1 per year.

The actual effect of the Decree

was a net reduction in the cost to Craig of the benefits provided
to _Goldie and the child of $105 per month.

DISPOSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
On or about March 5, 1980, a Memorandum of Findings and
Order was entered jointly by Carolyn N. Eklund, the Administrative
Law Judge, before whom the case was tried, and by John P. Abbott,
Director of the Office of Recovery Services, who had not been
present at the proceedings and had not heard the evidence.
Memorandum and Order concludes:
(1)

That Appellant, Craig Knudson, is entitled to a
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credit for the lot rental payments which he made to secure a
space upon which to locate the trailer; but
(2)

That Appellant is entitled to a credit neither (i)

for the reasonable rental value of the trailer itself (this is
a necessary inference but is not an explicit conclusion), nor
(ii) for the cost incurred by him in making the same available
for exclusive use by Goldie andtheir child. In this connection,
the Memorandum and Order somehow concludes that Appellant would
be "unjustly enriched" by such a credit, because the Decree of
,Divorce awarded

Craig one-half of the equity in the trailer --

a trailer for which Craig had paid all or substantially all of
the original consideration and all of the installment payments
for the nearly four years since its purchase.
The findings of fact included within the agency Memorandum
and Order are generally accurate, but they reflect only a slight
fraction of the undisputed facts adduced at the hearing.

Said

findings are inadequate either to support the agency decision
or to support any alternative decision.

However, the testimony

adduced at trial was credible, consistent and uncontroverted.
Additional findings based thereon should have been made, and
additional facts should have been adduced by the Department.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding, upheld the Order of
the Administrative Law Judge without comment concerning his
ratio decedendi (R.173).

No argument had been heard (R.169, 173).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the Third
Judicial District Court and of that portion of the administrative
Memorandum and Order which denies recognition to the reasonable
rental value of the housing and other benefits provided by
Appellant for his family during the period in question and
which thereby adjudicates Appellant's putative "support debt''
in derogation of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Appellant seeks a decision and Order from the Court determining
that he has no obligation to make reimbursement to the Department in this proceeding.
attorneys' fees.

Appellant further seeks an award of his

ARGUMENT
I .

THE DEPARTMENT IS BARRED FROM
RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT FROM APPELLANT
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
Utah law is clear that estoppel by judgment, or res judicata,
applies (i) not only to claims which were actually litigated but
to claims which might have. been litigated in the prior proceeding,
and (ii) not only to parties represented in the prior proceeding
but also to persons or entities "in privity with or claiming
through" a party appearing in the prior proceeding.

In the

recent case of Krofcheck vs. Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 240
(Utah, 1978) this Court reiterated these princiµles
in holding that the bar of res judicata or estoppel by judgment
applies when:
( 1)

the present case involves the same party or ''one in
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privity with or claiming through a party appearing in the
prior action;"
(2)

there has been a final judgment in the prior action;

(3)

the issue in question was raised or "could have been

and

raised" in the prior proceeding.
Each of the Krofcheck criterion has been met in the instant
case.

First, the Department freely admits in the course of its

argument (R.144) that it is in privity with a party to the prior
proceeding which is relevant here, i.e., the divorce action betwee1
Craig and Goldie.

Indeed, it claims to have been the "real

party in interest" in that prior action (R.144),and the Department claims to have been in privity with Goldie by virtue of
a written assignment of the very claims which were litigated
by Goldie in the prior action (R.144).

Moreover, the Department

has no independent right of recovery against Craig, except by
claiming through Goldie. This Court in Mecham vs.

~echam,

570

P.2d 123, (Utah, 1977) clearly so held:
"As to reimbursement for support furnished [by the
Department] to Maxine Mecham, the department's rights
are derivative from and no greater than Maxine's
rights." 570 P.2d at 125.
This principle was acknowledged and reaffirmed in the recent decision of the Court in Roberts vs. Roberts, 592 P.2d
597 (Utah, 1979).

Hence, the Department was in privity with

Goldie in the prior action for two separate reasons:

First,

the Department was in privity with Goldie as a matter of fact
by virtue of a written contract, wherein Goldie assigned to the
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Department the benefit of the very rights which she sued to
enforce in the prior action.

Second, the Department was in

privity with Goldie as a matter of law, because the Department's
rights

are entirely derivative from Goldie's rights.

That is

to say, the Department can only recover against Craig by "claiming
through Goldie."

Consequently, the Departroont's argument that

it was a real party in interest to the prior action by virtue
of a written assignment from Goldie hardly serves as a defense
against the application of res judicata to this case.

Quite the

contrary, such an argument admits and thereby proves that the
Department stood in privity with a party in the prior action.

As

such, the Department's admission demonstrates beyond any question
that the first standard of the Krofcheck test has been met.
The second standard of the Krof check test has also been
met:

there can be no question that a final judgment in the

prior divorce case has been entered.
Similarly, the third standard of the Krofcheck test has
been satisfied.

The question of liability for child support

payments not only "could have been litigated" but was actually
litigated in the prior proceeding.

In this connection, it

should be observed that the bar of res judicata applies so long
as the claim was raised or might have been raised, regardless
of whether it was actually decided in the prior proceeding.
See:

Krofcheck, supra: and Belliston vs. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d

379 (Utah, 1974) wherein this Court held:
"
. this court [has] stated that the doctrine of
res judicata applies not only to points and issues
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which were actually raised and decided in a prior
action, but also to those that could have been
adjudicated . . . " (521 P. 2d at 380).
The question of temporary alimony and child support was
actually raised in the prior proceeding.

Since Craig was pro-

viding adequate support for his family, Goldie chose not to
press her claim for temporary child support to judgment.

However,

a motion for temporary child support and alimony, together with a
supporting affidavit and order to show cause are of record in
the prior divorce proceeding; and the :affidavit is of record
in the administrative proceeding from which this appeal is
taken (R.75 to 77).
Applying the principles of Krofcheck and Belliston to a
case almost indistinguishable from the instant one, this Court
held that the principle of res judicata precluded the Department
of Social Services from seeking, after entry of a divorce decree
which failed to mention the temporary alimony and child support
that had been sought in that divorce proceeding, reimbursement for
support payments made during the pendency of the prior divorce
action.

In this connection, the Court held as follows:

"
. . the same principle applies to child support
which accumulated prior to the date of the [divorce]
decree . . . Maxine had pleaded in her complaint for
temporary child support; there was no provision in
the decree for any sum expended for support of the
child [during the pendency of the divorce action] .
Maxine also had a duty to support the child, Section
78-45-4.
Under the decree she was ordered to assume
and pay any and all debts she had incurred since the
filing of the complaint and to hold her husband harmless.
Maxine did not seek in the decree any sum for
reimbursement for the money she had expended for
support of the child, although she had put that matter
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at issue in her pleadings.
The rights of the Department
are derived through Maxine
the matter is res judicata."
Mecham vs. Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah, 1977) (emphasis added).
In the face of these compelling authorities, the Department has
contended that the Mecham decision was overruled by Roberts vs.
Roberts (R.144).

That is simply not true.

This Court in Roberts

reached a different result because the facts were different.

Nothing

in Roberts indicates that Mecham is overruled on its own facts.
Indeed,.the court in Roberts reaffirmed Mecham's cogency under facts
similar to those in evidence in the instant case by holding:
''Mecham does not prevent the State from ever obtaining
reimbursement for sums expended by the state prior to
a court decree.
Rather, it merely holds that the State's
right to reimbursement is derivative from the person entitled to support and is limited to the amount of support
fixed by the· court.
Because the district court assessed
no child support payments against the defendant until
after the effective date of the decree, the State was not
entitled to reimbursement for those sums expended upon
the child before the decree." Roberts vs. Roberts, 529
P.2d 597, 599 (Utah, 1979).
That is, indeed, the holding in Mecham.

And, more impor-

tantly, that remains clearly the law applicable to the facts of
this case.

The Court reached a different result in Roberts solely

because the Department had timely intervened and asserted its claim
in the Roberts' divorce action.

Consequ~ntly,

judicata was possible under Roberts' facts.

no claim of res

It would be clearly

erroneous, however, to conclude, as the Department argues, that
because the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable under
Roberts' facts, the Roberts decision must somehow overrule Utah
law on res judicata questions!
Moreover, the Court in Roberts mentioned the 1977 amendments to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, Utah
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Code Ann. §§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953), which may have been
made, in part, as a legislative response to the Mecham decision.
In particular, the legislature added
(Sess. L, 1977, Ch. 145, Sect. 11).

subsection (2) to §78-45-9
This provision provides as

follows:
"(2) No obligee shall commence any action to recover
support due or owing that obligee whether under this
act or any other applicable statute without first
filing an affidavit with the court stating whether
that obligee has received public assistance from any
source, and if the obligee has received public assistance, that the obligee has notified the department of
Social Services in writing of the pending action."
This provision was obviously inserted to protect the State
against the res judicata effects of decisions entered in divorce
proceedings.

It.should be observed, however, that the statute

clearly acknowledges that res judicata effects will attend any
final judgment entered in such divorce proceedings.

Otherwise,

there would be no need for such a statute.
Conceivably, the legislature could have provided for a
jurisdictional disability to proceed with divorce actions until
and unless the Department had been duly informed.
the legislature

Alternately,

could have provided that divorce decrees would

not become final vis-a-vis the Department, until and unless
the Department was made a party thereto.
legislature refused to do.

This, however, the

Rather, the legislature sought to

address this problem, not by changing the law with respect to
res judicata and the finality of judicial decrees, but rather
by requiring welfare recipients to notify the Department of
the pendency of such judicial proceedings in order that the
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Department might enter a timely appearance therein and thereby
act to protect its claims and interests against the bar of
res judicata which would otherwise apply.
Certainly, there is nothing in either this statute or in
the decisions of this Court which would even . renotely suggest that the principles of res judicata have been
somehow superseded or suspended as applied to the Department.
Indeed, the raison de etre of the post-Mecham statutory amendments was the accepted and understood application of the general
principles of res judicata to cases of this nature.

The Depart-

ment's argument that these authorities have somehow lifted the
bar of res judicata as applied to the Department is simply and
obviously a non sequitur.
Moreover, additional support for the theory that the Department is barred by the decree entered in the prior divorce
action is provided by Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(5) (1953) -- a
portion of the Public Support of Children Act:
"(5) Any Court order embodying a money judgment for
support to be paid to an obligee by any person -shall
be deemed [to be] in favor of the department [of
Social Services] to the extent of the amount of the
department's subrogation rights.
This transfer of
interest shall be applicable to court orders including,
but not limited to, temporary spouse support orders,
family naintenance orders, or alimony orders for the
benefit of a dependent child but allocated to the
benefit of that child on the basis of providing
necessities to the person in whose custody that
dependent child resides."
(emphasis added)
The clear implication of this statute is that the Department's rights are delimited by the court order entered in a prior
divorce proceeding.

The Department, by virtue of its "subrogation
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rights" gets the benefit of the judgment in a prior divorce
proceeding.

However, the Department should also bear the burden

of that adjudication as well.

The estoppel arising from the

entry of such a judgment must, in equity, be mutual.

Certainly,

there is nothing in the Public Support of Children Act which
would even remotely suggest that the Department may claim the
benefit of an estoppel arising from such a judicial decree but
still avoid the "inconvenience" of being bound by its less
favorable terms.

To get the benefit, the Department must bear

the burden.
This already clear implication is bolstered by the next
provision of the same statute, which declares:
"(6) The Department shall have the right to petition
the court for modification of any court order on the
same basis as a party to that action would have been
able to do so." §78-45b-3(6) (emphasis added).
The application of generally accepted and universally known
principles .or res judicata to the facts of this case is neither
unexpected nor unfair, even assuming, arguendo, that the
Department had a viable claim against the Appellant::;·

The

preclusion of that claim by the bar of res judicata is not the
Appellant's fault.

After all, the Appellant was merely a hapless

defendant in the divorce proceeding.

The Appellant was not in

privity with and had no direct responsibilities or obligations
to the Department.

Quite the contrary, the Departnent's

difficulties in this case were of its own making.

They were

the direct and proximate result of its own negligence in failing
to supervise and police the actions of its welfare recipients.
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Goldie, not Craig, had a duty to advise the Departnent of the
pendency of the divorce action.

The Department, not Craig,

had the responsibility to monitor Goldie's compliance with this
requirement.

Indeed, Craig had no reliable way of knowing

whether or not the Department had, in fact, any viable interest
in the divorce action.

Most assuredly, he was not a knowing

participant in any scherre or artifice to defraud the Departroont.
It made no difference to him whether the Department participated
in the divorce action or not.

In short, there is no conceivable

rationale upon which the burden of the Department's own negligence
or Goldie's either negligent or knowing om.issions should be placed
on Craig's shoulders.
The Department may have a claim against Goldie.
has no claim against

Craig.~

But it

The Department knew or reasonably

should have known that its rights would be precluded by any
action brought by Goldie.

That was the direct, clear and un-

avoidable meaning of the statutes under which the Department
was operating.

To the extent that Goldie deceived the Depart-

ment or, alternately, to the extent that the Department negligently
failed to intervene in the divorce proceeding notwithstanding
such notice, the Department has no claim against Craig and
no basis upon which to argue for broad and sweeping changes in
the hitherto well-accepted principles of res judicata otherwise
applicable to this case.
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II.
VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S STATUTORY AND
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY THE DEPARTMENT
SHOULD, AT LEAST, CAUSE THIS CASE TO BE
REMANDED FOR A FULL AND FAIR HEARING
The Department, however, seems to suggest that it has some
sort of separate, non-derivative right to reimbursement from
Appellant which exists apart from and was not precluded by the
adjudication of, Goldie's rights.

In this connection, the

Department argues:
" . . . in addition, subsequent legislation was passed
that specifically provided for payments which Meacham
[sic] precluded.
These provisions are set forth in
Utah Code Annotated [sic] 78-45-7(3)" (R.144).
But this theory is bereft of any support whatsoever, either in
the law of this State or in the record of this proceeding.
The_statute cited by the Department to support their
theory in fact provides as follows:
"78-45-7 Determination of Amount of Support.
(1) Prospective Support shall be equal to the amount
granted by prior court order unless there has been a
material change of circumstance on the part of the
obligor or the obligee.
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material
change in circumstances has occurred, the court _in
determining the amount of prospective support shall
consider all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) The standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) The ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) The need of the obligee;
(f) The age of the parties;
(g) The responsibility of the obligor for support
of others.
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court shall
determine and assess all arrearages based upon, but not
limited to:
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(a) The amount of public assistance received by
the obligee, if any;
(b) The funds that have been reasonably and
necessarily expended in the support of spouse and
children (emphasis added).
This statute is part of the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. §§78-45-1 to 78-45-13 (1953).

As

such, it deals exclusively with judicial determinations of the
amount of support to be provided to an "obligee. ''

On its face,

the statute,has no application to the facts of the instant case
because there was a prior court order entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction.

The issue of "arrearages" or temporary

support and alimony was raised in the prior judicial proceedings.
The court order entered therein adjudicated this matter for the
reasons amply indicated above.
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the provisions of
Section 78-45-7 apply to administrative agency proceedings,
rather than to judicial proceedings, and that the doctrine of
res judicata is inapplicable, the Department still has not
complied with the terms of this statute.

In determining the

amount of prospective support and of any "arrearages" owing
under a support obligation, the statute, when read as a whole,
clearly requires the court to consider "all relevant factors
including but not limited to" the standard of living of the
parties; the situation of the parties; the relative wealth and income of the parties; the ability of the obliger to earn; the ability
of the obligee to earn; the need of the obligee; the age of the
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parties; the responsibility of the obligor for the support of
others; and, to determine "arrearages", "when no prior court
order exists," the amount of public assistance received by the
obligee, if any.
In its administrative hearing, the Department provided no
evidence whatsoever bearing upon the standard of living and
situation of the parties, the relative wealth and income of the
parties, the ability of the obligor to earn a living, the ability
of the obligee to earn a living, the need of the obligee, the age
of the parties, or the possible responsibility of the obliger
for the support of others.

Indeed, the Department rested its

case after showing only the amount of the support payments made
to Goldie during the period in question.

No effort was made

to assess all or even to consider most of the other factors
required for a proper determination of the "support obligation"
of Appellant under the statute.
burden of proof on this issue.

Clearly, the Department had the
The minimal facts that were

presented relative to these considerations were produced by
Appellant.

This modicum of evidence consisted of Appellant's

testimony that during the period for which the Department seeks
reimbursement, Appellant was employed by LaBelle's as an audio
manager (R.43); that from 1973 through 1975, inclusive, Goldie
earned approximately $6,000 per year (R.45); that from 1975
through 1978 Goldie had no earnings (R.45); that after leaving
Appellant, Goldie requested that Appellant pay $200 each month
as child support (R.45); that Appellant had then declared he
could not afford to pay such support (R.46); and that Goldie
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I

worked during 1979 as a CETA summer work program bookkeeper
(R.51).

Appellant also introduced a certified copy of the divorce

decree (R. 66 - 68), the findings of fact and conclusions of law
in the divorce proceeding (R.69 - 74), and the affidavit Goldie
had used in an attempt to get support during the pendency of the
divorce proceeding (R.75 - 77).
There is no provision in any Utah statute which makes the
provision of public assistance the sole and exclusive determinant
of an obliger's duty to make reimbursement to the Department.
The Supreme Court in Mecham observed:
" . . . the duty of support of the obliger is to the
obligee.
The State Department of Social Services has
only the right to enforce the amount of support which .
is due the obligee from the obliger. The department
may not unilaterally determine that amount and then
enforce a right to reimbursement by an action . . . "
570 P.2d at 125 (emphasis added).
Certainly, this principle was not overruled by the statute
in question (Section 78-45-7(3)), nor by the subsequent decision
in Roberts.

Rather, the Court in Roberts held:

"However, the above amendment [Section 78-45-7(3)] would
constitute a denial of due process to the obliger's
spouse if the court assessed the obliger for all public
assistance payments received by the obligee, without
considering relevant factors such as the relative wealth
and income of the parties; and the ability of the
parties to earn income.
Under [section] 78-45-7(2)
seven such factors are required to be considered in
determining the amount of prospective support. Under
the Public Support of Children Act [78-45b-6(2)],
which provides an administrative procedure for obtaining
reimbursement for assistance payments made on behalf
of minor children, similar factors must be considered
in the hearing to determine the extent of the parent's
liability for child support [footnote omitted]. The
assessment of arrearages under [section] 78-45-7(3)
must also be subject to consideration of the same
factors." 592 P.2d at 599 (emphasis added).
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It is, in fact, the Public Support of Children Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§78-45b-l to 78-45b-22 (1953), which

gove~ns

of administrative hearing held in the instant case.

the type

Section

78-45b-4 provides the method for the Department to collect a
support debt established by prior court order.

Sections 78-45b-5

and 78-45b-6 provide for an administrative hearing to establish
the required support in the absence of a prior court order.

But

in the instant case the divorce decree determined sub silentio
that no support debt was owed by Appellant.
Even when such an administrative hearing is proper, Section
78-45b-6(2) requires a "full and fair" hearing that considers
factors similar to those mandated by Section 78-45-7(2).

It must

be clear beyond cavil, then, that the provision of prior public
assistance to an obligee is not the talisman of "reimbursement"
liability as against the obligee's husband or father.

Rather,

before any obligation to make reimbursement to the Department may
be constitutionally determined, all of the relevant factors
"including but not limited to" those set forth in Section 78-45-7(2)
must be carefully considered.
considered in this case.

Few, if any, of those factors were

The Department made no effort whatsoever

to adduce any testimony or other evidence bearing upon such
factors.

Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous language in

Roberts to the contrary, the Department blithely and blindly
argues that subsection (3) of Section 78-45-7 is somehow a
self-effectuating mandate for reimbursement completely independent
of the provisions of subsection (2) of the same statute.
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The

incredible thing about this daring argument is that the Department
has the remarkable temerity to cite Roberts in support of this
contention!
It is equally intriguing that the Order of the Administrative
Law Judge was assertedly based, at least partially, upon the prior
decree of divorce that rendered such an administrative proceeding
improper and upon the affidavit with which Goldie had unsuccessfully
sought temporary support in the prior divorce proceeding (R.86).
In view of the existence of the prior divorce decree which
demonstrated Appellant had no support debt, the Department, as
noted above, riould not have properly proceeded under Section
78-45-7, 78-45b-4, or 78-45b-5.
a

The Department should have sought

modification of the divorce decree in accordance with Section

78-45b-3(6):
"(6) The Department shall have the right to petition
the court for modification of any court order on the
same basis as a party to that action would have been
able to do so." Section 78-45b-3(6) (emphasis added).
But it is clear that Goldie, as party to the prior divorce
proceeding, cannot now seek a retroactive modification of the
divorce decree entered therein.

That decree has become final.

The time periods provided in Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure for the change or modification of said decree
have long since expired.

Certainly, Goldie could not now seek

to re-open said decree and request a retrospective award of
"temporary alimony and child support."

If Goldie cannot properly

seek such a retroactive modification of the prior decree, there
is no reason in law or logic why the Department should be able
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to do so.

Indeed, this is precisely what the statute proscribes.

Even were Section 78-45b-5 not rendered inapplicable by its
own terms and the prior divorce decree, the Department should not
be permitted to do indirectly under Section 78-45b-5 that which
it cannot do directly under Section 78-45b-3.

Yet this is precisely

what the Department purported to do in this case.
Consequently, the Department's mistaken argument that the
primary issue before the Court on this appeal is whether or not
the Department should be obligated to "consider" payments in-kind
as support for a dependent child (R.144) simply begs the question.
Before this issue may be properly addressed by the Court, the
Department must first overcome two insurmountable obstacles:
(1)

The Department must somehow avoid the res judicata

effects of the prior judicial decree entered in the divorce action
which, under both Utah case law and the relevant Utah statutes,
is dispositive of the issue which the Department seeks to raise
anew under the guise of "reimbursement."
(2)

Having once avoided the application of res judicata,

the Department must still establish that it has fully satisfied
the requirements of Section 78-45-7(2) and Section 78-45b-6(2)
which require it to plead and prove the material elements
necessary to establish a proper support obligation, ''including,
but not limited to," the standard of living of the parties, the
sitaution of the parties, the relative wealth and income of the
parties, the ability of the obligor to earn income, the ability
of the obligee to earn income, the need of the obligee for
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financial support, the age of the parties, the responsibility of
the obliger to support others, and similar factors which may be
material to a proper and circumspect assessment of a support
obligation.

The Department has utterly failed to carry this

burden of proof.

The record is even devoid of any evidence

arguably sufficient to permit

f~ndings

on these issues.

III.
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE PRECLUDE
THE DEPARTMENT FROM RECOVERING REIMBURSEMENT
FROM APPELLANT
It is only after the Department has somehow satisfied
the foregoing burdens that any question as to the efficacy of
payments-in-kind to satisfy a support obligation can be properly
raised.

;j:

The Department has argued that a "general rule" exists
which declares "that the father is not entitled as a matter of
law to credit for . . . voluntary expenditures when they are
made in a manner other than that specified by the support order
or divorce decree'' (R.145).

But the fact of paramount importance

is that the instant case does not present a question of payments-inkind tendered to satisfy a liquidated judicial decree ordering
payments-in-cash, much less the even more remote question of the
efficacy of payments-in-kind to satisfy already accrued payments
under such a decree.

Moreover, even if this case presented a

situation within the purview of that so-called "general rule",
this Court has repeatedly recognized "equitable
exceptions" to the "general rule" which would be applicable.
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See, e.g., Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 42 P.2d 191 (Utah, 1935) (dictum)
and Boggs vs. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah, 1974) (dictum).
Considering the agreement between Appellant and Goldie that
Goldie and her child could live in the trailer house, which was
paid for by Appellant and the title for which was in the name of
Appellant qnly (R.53), in lieu of Appellant's making cash payments
for child support demanded by Goldie but not ordered by any court
(R.46), the most compelling case is Ross vs. Ross, 592 P.2d 600,
603-604 (Utah, 1979) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added):
"Plaintiff is not entitled, however to credit for
expenditures made on behalf of the children or
defendant which do not specifically conform to the
terms of the decree.
To do so would permit plaintiff to vary the terms of the decree and to usurp
from defendant the right to determine the manner
in which the money should be spent.
Only if the
defendant has consented to the plaintiff's voluntary
expenditures as an alternative manner of satisfying
his alimony and child support obligation, can
plaintiff receive credit for such expenditures."
Obviously, the Appellant would not object should the Court
decide to apply such an "equitable exception" as a rubric for
reaching a correct result here.

Indeed, the compelling cir-

cumstances of the present case certainly call for the application
of such an "equitable exception," assuming that the "general
rule" applies at all.

But speculation over the scope and applica-

t ion of such ''equitable except ions" is unnecessary under the
circumstances of this case, because this case does not fall
withinthepurview of the ostensible "general rule" in any event.
During the period in question, there was no court order
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I!'

requiring Appellant to pay any specific amount of support in cash
or otherwise.

Moreover, there was then -- and is now -- no legal

requirement that a man, during coverture, support his wife and
child by payments in cash.

Prior to the entry of a judicial

decree requiring liquidated support payments in cash, the question

t

of whether or not a husband and father is providing adequately is

~

not and cannot be fairly and rationally analyzed in terms of

~

"cash payments."

Rather, the question of whether such an

"ob~igor"

is providing support must be determined by reference to whether
or not he has provided his family with the reasonable necessities
of life, including such items as housing, food, and clothing.
Certainly, it cannot be meaningfully contended -- as the Department incredibly, if intrepidly, argues by implication -- that a
father is not supporting his family when he is providing them
with the necessities of life unless such payments are in cash.
Had Craig paid Goldie $225.00 per month in cash -- an amount
established in an arm's length transaction as the rental value
of the trailer house (R.44, 59) -- so that Goldie could have rented
the same housing which she and her child occupied gratis

at

Appellant's expense of $256 per month (R.53, 75), then, apparently,
the Department would have no complaint.

However, because Appellant

provided this benefit "in-kind", the Department considers it
to be "administratively inconvenient" to acknowledge its existence
(R.27,145).

. Surely this is a distinction without a difference.

Furthermore, either the benefits conferred ($225 per month) or
the costs incurred ($256 per month) exceed the $176 per month
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"support debt" alleged by the Department to exist.
Still, the Department essentially argues that it is "too confusing" and too much of a burden for the Department to consider
anything other than cash payments:
"The Department suggests that the general rule is
sound because if you begin making exceptions there
is [sic] no factual or legal criteria [sic] upon
which to base such exceptions.
At what point do
benefits begin and end, how are the benefits
determined, how much credit should be given, are
just a few of the questions that come to mind
if the petitioner's theories are followed.
The
benefit theory espoused could only lead to an
administrative and legal nightmare.
This is
particularly true when the department is involved,
rather than the parties to the marriage" (R.145).
Once again, the Department appears to be arguing that
its rights are somehow different from and superior to those of
"the parties to the marriage."

Since Utah law is clear that the

Department's rights are entirely derived from
this position is nonsense.

Goldie's rights,

However, the Department continues to

argue:
"As a practical matter the problems become insurmountable.
What is the simple solution? Prohibit the "in
lieu of" payments.
This solution is certainly not an
illogical and incomprehensible theory as suggested by
petitioner, but represents a workable and sound basis
for the resolution of the factual and legal problems
which are inherent in the petitioner's proposed
theories" (R.146).
The Administrative Law Judge specifically denied Appellant
any credit for the benefits he conferred or the costs he incurred
in making the trailer house available to Goldie and her child because
the divorce decree awarded Appellant one-half of the equity in the
trailer house for which he alone had paid and the title to which
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was solely in his name (R.86).

Under ·the view most favorable to

Appellant, he lost $225 rental income per month; spent $60 per
month to rent a space for the trailer house; and made $196 in
payments for the trailer and its protection, only half of the
benefit of which did he receive.

Thus, he "spent" $225 plus $60

plus $98, or a total of $383, per month as "child support."

Under

the view most favorable to Respondents, which requires assuming
that the lot rental of $60 was included in the trailer rental of
$225 and that the divorce decree gave Goldie an equity in the
trailer retroactive to the pendency of the divorce proceedings,
the time for which the Department seeks reimbursement, Appellant
"spent" 1/2($225 - $60) plus $60 plus $98, or a total of $240.50,
per month as "child support."

Such calculations do not seem overly

burdensome; but even they are unnecessary because, as noted above,
either the rental value of the trailer alone ($225 per month)
or Appellant's out-of-pocket cost ($256 per month) for providing
such housing exceeds the $176 per month demanded by the Department
and the $150 per month established by the divorce decree as child
support for the period after the time for which the Department
seeks reimbursement.

(It should again be remembered that despite

Goldie's motion for temporary support during the pendency of the
divorce action

'

the divorce decree awarded no such temporary support.)

The Appellant would be strenuously taxed to find a more
damning and compelling indictment of the unreasonable, unconstitutional and grossly unfair position of the Department than that
contained with the above quotations.

The multiplication of
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"administrative difficulties" is certainly no argument for the
abridgment of substantial and, under the Roberts decision, constitutional rights of the individual involved.

The Department

is all too quick to forget that it has the burden of proof, that
it is bound as a governmental agency to observe the Constitution,
and that its internal convenience is not the touchstone of the
legal principles involved.

Certainly, its proposed approach to

making these factual determinat.ions -- which apparently consists
of largely, if not exclusively,

ignoring "inconvenient" facts -

casts considerable doubt· upon the limits which the Department
sets upon itself in its own, in-house administrative proceedings
to "adjudicate" its rights against individual citizens.

Such

a Departmental philosophy is hardly surprising, however, when
one considers the latitude available for Departmental review
of the Administrative Law Judge's findings:
"78-45b-6.l. Findings and order by department
Judicial review -- (1) Upon receipt of the administrative hearing officer's report of findings on the issues
designated for hearing, the department may accept the
report of findings as the basis for a final order or
upon filing a statement of the legal or substantial
factual basis in the record therefor, it may:
(a) Reject all or any portion of the findings
and remand for further hearing and findings on
specified issues;
(b) Disregard any portion of the findings and
proceed to enter a final order based upon the remainder
of the findings;
(c) Substitute alternative or additional findings
of fact on the issues designated for hearing, if the
substituted findings are supported by a preponderance
of the evidence in the record.
The department shall
then cause its findings and order to be served upon
the responsible parent."
Indeed, counsel for the Department might extend his fatuous
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arguments to an almost limitless extent.

It is hardly conceivable

that the "convenience" of the Department will be subserved by
a simple distinction between "in-kind" and "in-cash" payments.
Certainly the Department's arguments would apply with equal vigor
to payments made, quite literally, "in-cash" for which no receipt
was given and no cancelled check may be produced.

Similarly,

the Department might make precisely the same sort of argument
with respect to payments made "in-cash" which, in the Department's
curious and incomprehensible lexicon, somehow "benefited" the
payer.

For example, if an obligor makes a cash payment to an

obligee, which the obligee then uses to make a house payment,
which in turn might possibly result in the protection of the obligor's
equity therein, will the Department be satisfied to credit the
entire payment simply because it was "in-cash"?

According to its

argument, the Department cannot be discommoded by having to
determine the relative "benefits" involved.

Clearly the

Department's "administrative convenience" might be impaired by
examining these questions, which do not differ in any material
respect from those which it finds intolerably inconvenient in
the present case.
In short, the Department does not propose a clear and comprehensible legal rule when it seeks to elevate its bureaucratic
convenience into a self-effectuating fiat; it only creates an
arbitrary and unfair rule which does justice to neither party.
Obviously, little is gained by imagining "administrative
difficulties" and multiplying the hypothetical ramifications of
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these difficulties into some sort of "parade of horribles."

The

basic and ineluctable issue here is not the Department's convenience!
but rather the Appellant's rights.

The Department would do well

to remember that the due process clauses of the Utah and Federal

....

Constitutions were inserted therein to guarantee that individual
citizens would be treated justly and fairly when they dealt with
governmental agencies.

This may be, and usually is, ''adminis-

·'

tratively inconvenient;" but it is still the law, and the supreme
law at that.
The question here, as the Court observed in both Mecham
and Roberts, is one of due process of law.

The facts of this

case graphically demonstrate the most execrable denial of due
process to this Appellant.

He has been forced to re-litigate

issues which already had been determined in his favor by a court
of competent jurisdiction.

By so doing, he has been forced to pay

··

for the Department's bureaucratic bungling and negligence in
the administration of its own responsibilities.

He has been

coerced to appear before an administrative tribunal whose impartiality and constitutional efficacy are at best questionable.
He has been victimized by a proceeding in which clear, comprehensible, and uncontradicted evidence has been disregarded out-ofhand.

He has witnessed the Department utterly fail to meet the

statutory standards and burden of proof applicable to the instant.case.
He has seen a decision made and signed by an administrative
officer who was not even present at the so-called "full and fair
hearing."

He has received a decision which ignores the facts
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..

~·

that were submitted into evidence.

In sum, he has received an

administrative decision which is founded primarily upon the
"general rule" that the Department always wins, and which "is
sound because if you begin making exceptions there is [sic] no
factual or legal criteria [sic] upon which to base such exceptions"
(R.145).

On this appeal, he has been told in precisely that

language that the administrative hearing process could offer him
no relief, since it would be "inconvenient" to consider the
actual facts of his case.

This kind of protracted and egregious

denial of due process should be redressed by this Court on this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Both the relevant Utah statutory and case law establish
~

that the decree of divorce was res judicata upon Goldie's and

P

the Department's right to recover funds expended on behalf of·
Appellant and Goldie's son during the pendency of the divorce
proceedings.

That decree demonstrated Appellant had no support

obligation for the period in question beyond the support he had
already provided.
The Department, in seeking to obtain reimbursement from
Appellant, utilized a path which was statutorily proscribed
because of the existence of the prior divorce decree.

Moreover,

the Department even failed to consider the factors that due
process as well as the applicable statutes and cases mandate
when an administrative adjudication of a putative support debt
is a proper course to pursue.

And the Department has failed to
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utilize in a timely fashion the appropriate means of redressjudicial modification of the divorce decree.
Finally, the undisputed facts of this case show beyond
reasonable question that Appellant furnished support which more
than satisfied even the Department's demand for

$17~

per month

during the pendency of the divorce proceeding.
Therefore, the decisions of the Third Judicial District
Court and the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed; this
Court should declare that Appellant owes nothing to the Department for child support during the pendency of the divorce action.
If this is not done, the Court should, at least, remand the case
so that the statutorily required factual determinations can be
made.

And, in view of the egregiously bad faith exhibited by the

Department in pursuing Appellant, with full knowledge of the
prior divorce decree, contrary to the clear dictates of due
process, relevant statutes, and controlling case law, this Court
should, in all equity and good conscience, award Appellant his
attorneys' fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of February, 1982.
JENSEN

& LLOYD

870 Commercial Security Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0457
Telephone:
(801) 322-2300
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY DELIVERY
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I have this
day personally served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel of record for the Defendants
and Respondents by hand-delivering the same to his offices in
Ogden, Utah as follows:
't·

Robert D. Barclay
Municipal Building, First Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401

:fo1

:a~

DATED this 25±h

day of February, 1982.

urt
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